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Hoarding has become increasingly prominent in clinical practice and popular culture in recent 
years, giving rise to extensive research and commentary. Critical responses in the social 
sciences have criticised the cultural assumptions built in to the construct of ‘hoarding 
disorder’ and expressed fears that it may generate stigma outweighing its benefits; however, 
few of these studies have engaged directly with ‘hoarders’ themselves. This paper reports on 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with ten individuals living in England, who received 
assessment and intervention for hoarding from Social Services. Their narratives drew on the 
cultural repertoire of values and discourses around waste and worth, the mediation of 
sociality and relationships through material objects, physical constraints on keeping order, 
and the role played by mental health. Analysing these perspectives anthropologically shows 
how dominant models of hoarding, such as the DSM-5 paradigm, potentially lend themselves 
to reductionist understandings that efface the meaning ‘hoarding’ may have and thereby deny 
agency to the person labelled as ‘hoarder’. More culturally informed analysis, by contrast, 
affords insights into the complex landscape of value, waste, social critique, emotion, 
interpersonal relationships and practical difficulties that may underlie hoarding cases, and 
points the way to more person-centred practice and analysis. 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
Introduction  
Hoarding disorder (HD) appeared in the psychiatric lexicon in the lead-up to the 5th Edition 
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) (APA 2013). A 
person with HD experiences difficulty in getting rid of possessions regardless of their value, 
resulting in obstruction of living areas which prevents them being put to their intended use, 
and causing distress, impaired daily living or safety concerns. Whereas hoarding had 
previously only appeared as a symptom within Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD), 
DSM-5 saw it fissioned off from its parent diagnosis and incorporated for the first time as HD, 
a new, discrete diagnosis in its own right. This clinical development is the culmination of 
broader processes in society’s approach to the issue of hoarding. A key influence has been the 
development of cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) models by US-based psychologists and 
social workers over the last two decades, which frame it through the prism of difficulties in 
information processing, distorted beliefs, and habituated emotional responses in regard to 
possessions (Wheaton 2016). Medicalisation of hoarding through inclusion in the DSM is 
entirely compatible with this model, and with research streams attributing it to genetic 
inheritance (Hirschtritt and Matthews 2014) or neuropsychological deficits (Slyne and Tolin 
2014). These shifts parallel the increasingly high profile hoarding has gained in recent years, 
as popular television shows and books have moulded popular perceptions of individuals 
whose accumulation of possessions is judged to be excessive.  
 
DSM-5 has been widely attacked for what might be labelled its own ‘hoarding’ tendencies. 
Each successive edition of the DSM has seen the accumulation of new diagnoses and the 
extension of existing ones (Mayes & Horwitz 2005:251), and the latest is no exception. There 
are concerns about psychiatric over-reach and the pathologisation of unremarkable human 
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experiences (Allen 2013; BPS 2011; Paris 2015). A diagnosis of HD legitimises certain 
interventions, such as therapy or use of mental health legislation. There may be welcome 
consequences, e.g. support that forestalls eviction or forced clearances (Braye et al. 2017; 
Slatter 2007). Less welcome, perhaps, is that diagnosis simultaneously delegitimises the 
perspectives individuals may hold regarding their property, through the required DSM-5 
specifiers ‘good/fair,’ ‘poor’ or ‘absent’ insight. These sweeping categorisations exclude 
consideration of how biographical, cultural and psychological factors may render behaviours 
meaningful, and obscure any agency patients show in assigning their own meanings to the 
labels they are given. This reductionism matters for several reasons: neglecting patients’ 
experience may lead to their relationships with professionals becoming strained; it may help 
justify over-ready resort to subtle or less subtle imposition of interventions; it may remove 
focus from stigmatising societal reactions that contribute as much or more to distress as 
individual pathology; and most insidiously, it may undermine service users’ scope for 
exploring alternative value systems and self-definitions, cutting off reflections which might 
ultimately prove beneficial to them (Braye et al. 2014; Kleinman 1988; Martin 2009). DSM 
admittedly informs rather than dictates health and social care practice, but as a number of 
anthropological and psychiatric critiques have noted (Kleinman 1988; Kirmayer 2015; 
Luhrmann 2001), the positivism in which it is based encourages denial of the socio-cultural 
and experiential significance of symptoms. 
 
This paper explores accounts from individuals identified as hoarders by human service 
agencies in England. Taking seriously the meanings they place on their experiences, it 
investigates what might be lost within a model that locates people’s relationship with their 
possessions purely in terms of cognitive ‘functions’ and pathology. Instead, being alert to 
personal and cultural factors shaping ‘hoarding’ – rather than disregarding them for an 
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overriding focus on the risks, deficits and symptoms taken to be bound up with it – reveals 
rich lifeworlds of meaning which call for a more careful, nuanced and intersubjectively 
informed implementation of the mental health paradigm. 
 
Studying Hoarding: Clinical and Critical Perspectives 
How diagnostic boundaries are drawn is inevitably influenced not just by knowledge 
formations but by societal values and priorities (Jutel 2011; Kleinman 1988). Even ardent 
proponents of the diagnosis often acknowledge that the questions hoarding raises about 
consumerist norms have no easy answers and challenge the ease with which most people 
discard ‘worthless’ items (e.g. Frost & Steketee 2010). It should not therefore be assumed 
that ‘proponents’ entirely reject critical insights, any more than most ‘critics’ deny that 
hoarding is sometimes linked to significant suffering and distress.Generally, however, the 
diagnostic literature locates the ‘problem’ in the mind of the individual hoarder and, though 
sometimes recognising the dangers of too broad an application of diagnostic criteria, 
perceives the pragmatic benefits of the new diagnosis to outweigh the disadvantages (e.g. 
Mataix-Cols & Pertusa 2012; Nordsletten et al. 2013). By contrast, wider-angle perspectives 
to be found in the critical literature refocus attention on society, suspending judgements about 
individual pathology and asking instead why hoarding so reliably elicits framings as a mental 
health issue. For instance, Herring’s (2014) conceptual genealogy of the gradual emergence 
of hoarding as a social problem in the 20th-century US traces the role played by successive 
“moral panics,” which linked the disorder produced by hoarding to racial and class fears. This 
history highlights HD’s stigmatising potential and disproportionate effects on disempowered 
social groups. Others argue that hoarding’s provocation lies in how the “ambiguous matter” 
(Maycroft 2009) it gathers disrupts taken-for-granted patterns of consumption. In this view, 
value is defined relationally; without consensus on a category of ‘rubbish’ for comparison 
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and contrast, the assignation of worth to other items becomes threateningly destabilised 
(Lepselter 2011; Thompson 1979), occasioning reactions that discredit the hoarder and 
his/her behaviour.  
 
The critical literature reflects on whether disorder might sometimes be productive (DeNegri-
Knott & Parsons 2014; Maycroft 2009), asking whether there are sometimes alternative ways 
to frame the psychological deficits through which hoarding is commonly understood. Here 
the hoarder’s ongoing failure to make decisions about keeping and discarding is validated as 
a functional deferral that keeps possible futures open (Lepselter 2011). Exaggeration of tiny 
or non-existent differences between apparently identical items, and inability to enforce a 
hierarchy of value on things, are revalorised as attention to subtle distinctiveness and a 
heightened respect for objects (Bennett 2012; Smail 2014; see also Frost & Steketee 2010:15). 
Mistaken anthropomorphic tendencies to invest emotionally in things rather than people 
(Neave et al. 2015) are revealed as an instance of actually quite widespread modes of relating, 
that acknowledge how people and things are mutually constituting (Kilroy-Marac 2016; 
Newell 2014).   
 
The work of these writers shows how the particular relationships between self, possessions, 
and surroundings that characterise hoarding might be drawn differently. However, it 
noticeably lacks direct engagement with the perspectives of ‘hoarders’ themselves (Maycroft 
2009), either relying on historical accounts (Herring, Smail), televisual portrayals edited as 
much for entertainment as for instructional value (Bennett, Eddy, Lepselter), or extrapolating 
from findings with non-hoarders to extend a theoretical argument to cover hoarding (Newell). 
It remains therefore to bring these valuable critical accounts into dialogue with studies that 
engage directly with ‘hoarders’ themselves. Proponents of HD as a disorder, meanwhile, have 
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done more to elicit the perspectives of hoarders: during the London Field Trial that 
contributed to recognition of HD in the DSM-5, 29 individuals identified as meeting criteria 
for HD were asked about their perceptions of the acceptability, usefulness and potential for 
stigma of the proposed diagnosis (Mataix-Cols et al. 2013). However, though consultation of 
service users during the development of a new diagnosis is certainly welcome, it is 
noteworthy that the sample was recruited from among those who were attending an existing 
hoarding support group and responders to advertisements on patient organisation websites. 
Those who did not themselves choose the label ‘hoarder’ may have very different views. 
These data therefore need complementing with a wider range of perspectives.  
 
The participants in the present study had, through different trajectories, come into social work 
or social care caseloads. Most had initially been wary of services’ involvement. In interviews, 
they offered their accounts of why they ‘hoarded’. These accounts drew on explanations that 
referenced, but were far from defined by, the definitions offered by mental health discourses. 
Individual values and biographical trajectories informed how their perspectives echoed, 
contested or adapted positions drawn from the ‘cultural repertoire’ (Hannerz 1969). By this 
we refer to the collective arrays of discourses, explanations and symbols to which individuals 
may have recourse in accounting for their own or others’ experiences. Individuals draw 
selectively from this cultural knowledge, which has been described as akin to a ‘tool kit’ for 
sense-making (ibid; Swidler 1986). The narrative agency shown by participants in making 
use of such repertoires as are available to them offers insights into how people interpellated 
by the label ‘hoarders’ may situate themselves at this contemporary moment in hoarding’s 
evolution as a disorder.  
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This narrative focus is foregrounded here ahead of non-human agency. Sophisticated 
approaches to the theorisation of people-thing relations have been developed in recent 
decades, which reject the sharp ontological divide between animate and inanimate matter on 
philosophical and ethnographic grounds (Latour 1993). Instead they focus on routes by which 
to investigate the dialectical process through which people and things come to mutually 
constitute each other (Miller 2008; 2010), their equivalently agentive, mutual entanglements 
in networks (Latour 2005), or more speculatively the ‘vitality’ and ‘affect’ (Bennett 2010:61) 
that inheres in objects as well as people. Some of this thinking, particularly that of Miller 
about how things can mediate, or even constitute, relationships, informs our analysis; 
however, this remains an inductive narrative rather than thing-based study for both practical 
and theoretical reasons. Practically, at the point when we encountered participants, many of 
the ‘hoarded’ objects had been disposed of, making it difficult and – because of that ‘loss’ – 
potentially distressing to work through object-centred ethnography. Theoretically, our interest 
in this article is primarily in how people who hoard respond to that label, and only 
secondarily in what their justifications might tell us about human-thing interactions more 
widely. This prioritisation is a corrective to the previous inattention to hoarders’ views, rather 
than indicating any more fundamental theoretical statement on human-thing ontologies.  
 
Methods 
The question addressed in this article is how individuals make sense of the behaviours that 
have led to them being labelled as ‘hoarders’ by the state agencies tasked with intervening in 
such situations. Individuals’ stories were sought through interviews carried out as part of a 
larger, multi-methods study into self-neglect in 2013-14 (Braye et al. 2014). Interviewees 
were provided a space for reflexive narration about how their current situation had developed, 
and the involvement of human services in their lives. Though many of their experiences 
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preceded the official creation of HD, nevertheless they were clearly classified by agencies as 
‘hoarders’ at a time when the diagnosis was already being flagged and indirectly influencing 
practice.  
 
The relationship between the data discussed here and the study into self-neglect of which it 
was a part1 requires some explanation. During the larger study, the authors interviewed 
people in situations of self-neglect. In England, hoarding is considered to fall within the 
category of self-neglect, as statutory guidance issued soon after the study explicitly 
confirmed (DH 2014: 234, updated 2016), so unsurprisingly it featured prominently within 
the larger study. A sub-set of 10 individuals among those interviewed reported intervention 
for hoarding; it is this sub-set that provided the data explored here.  
 
Participants were recruited through social workers, based within 10 different, geographically 
dispersed local authorities. They identified and made initial contact with clients who they felt 
might contribute to the study. Using this method to access interviewees allowed practitioners 
to play a gatekeeping role; this was protective of clients whose current situation or mental 
state made it inappropriate to interview them, but also meant that those selected were more 
likely to have at least a minimally cordial relationship with Social Services and perhaps to 
entertain the view that they ‘hoarded’ than hoarders generally. They may have been 
distinctive in this and in agreeing to participate in interviews; nevertheless, the views they 
expressed were diverse and did not simply echo professional discourses. All ten participants 
were aged between 50 and 80 years; five were male and five female.  
 
In-depth, semi-structured interviews took place in different venues chosen by the clients, 
mostly the offices of social care organisations or interviewees’ own homes. In those homes 
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we were shown around, some participants described the significant reduction in things that 
had been achieved to make the homes navigable, usually with a degree of pride tinged with 
regret. In these, piles of things remained on most available surfaces; in others, objects spilled 
over each other with no immediately evident organising principle. One resident had made the 
landing outside his flat (which had previously been traversable only through tunnels in the 
‘hoard’) into a ‘sitting room’ with furniture; it was only at the end of the interview that he 
invited the interviewer to see inside. The accumulations of things in some areas were dusty, 
but the homes were mostly in reasonable repair; in some cases this was the result of recent 
renovation work, where rotted wood and carpets or broken heating had been replaced now 
that they were accessible. Three interviewees indicated where accumulated cat faeces or thick 
grime had been cleaned.  Among the topics covered in the interviews were clients’ 
experiences of hoarding, how services had become involved, and their views on different 
stages of the process. Sometimes interviewees discussed specific items they had at hand, and 
these moments helped build rapport. Interviews were mostly recorded and transcribed; 
careful notes were taken instead with three interviewees who preferred not to be recorded. 
Each interview took place with one of the three authors. Interview duration ranged between 
45 minutes and 2 ½ hours.  
 
Data analysis followed the framework method (Gale et al. 2013), ensuring that the approach 
to the data was systematic, traceable and consistent across the interviews carried out by all 
authors. An initial index of general codes, prepared from the topic list of the semi-structured 
interviews and through reading and re-reading a sample of transcripts, was developed and 
then applied to index the content of all passages within the transcripts. All the data were then 
grouped by code into an analytic matrix, which enabled comparison by code of relevant data 
between and within interviews. Further thematic analysis was then carried out, focusing this 
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time not just on the topic relevance of what interviewees had said, but on newly identified 
themes emerging from the interview data themselves, rather than from the initial framework. 
The analysis in this paper focuses on the themes that emerged from the codes relating to the 
nature of hoarding. This approach yielded four major themes that characterised the discourses 
drawn on by the study participants: notions of value and waste; connections with sociality, 
relationships and/or loss; physical constraints; and the role of mental health. Often these 
themes overlapped within a single person’s account.   
 
Making Sense of Hoarding 
Most hoarders’ accounts were consistent in that they found ways of making sense of the 
phenomenon. The reasons varied, but there was usually an explanation lying behind the 
hoarding; it was not seen as the predetermined result simply of cognitive, affective, genetic or 
neurochemical deficits, but as intelligible to varying extents once the context was known. 
Beyond that, however, situations and narratives could be very different; as Sophie, one of the 
interviewees, put it, ‘All hoarders are individuals with individual reasons.’ She herself 
seemed to have assumed – not without ambivalence –an identity within which hoarding was 
an integral part, declaring that ‘Hoarding is my mind.’ On learning about our research, she 
had invited the interviewer to her home, saying that ‘My mind is my house,’ and felt it was 
important to see how she lived if we were to understand why she hoarded. Sitting amidst 
piles of clothes, shoes, books, supermarket goods, and jumble sale acquisitions, some of 
which spilled out of the conservatory into the garden, she talked about how, while her parents 
were alive, she ‘used to keep drawers and cupboards tidy’ under their influence, but that 
doing so had created ‘a false impression.’ ‘This,’ she added, ‘is me as I really am.’ 
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Sophie was unusual among our interviewees in the extent to which she had explicitly 
configured her perception of her ‘real self’ around her hoarding, but many foregrounded in 
their accounts different ways in which the ‘hoarding’ habit held significant personal meaning 
for them. Often such meaning co-existed alongside practical constraints that they reported 
made it difficult to impose more normative standards of order within their homes. 
 
Notions of value and waste 
Participants commonly foregrounded the significant personal value invested in the 
possessions they had accumulated. Where they did not embrace the term ‘hoarding’ as Sophie 
appeared to – and many did not – it was this discourse that they employed to dispute the 
terminology that others casually used and the assumptions behind it. Individuals sometimes 
related the worth that they saw in the materials they owned to hobbies or to the use-value that 
items might have. Hence Bruce, who had accumulated vast amounts of scrap metal, timber, 
old furniture and other materials in his upper-floor apartment, was at pains to distinguish 
between parts of his hoard: 
Anyway the doctor said, “You had 15 tons of rubbish?!” I said, “It was not all 
rubbish,” because I did object to that word.  
Sometimes interviewees differentiated between hoarding and collecting. When he first met 
with the support worker who would help him clear his apartment, Don had said:  
“But I’m not a hoarder,” and [he] agreed with me that I’m not a ‘hoarder hoarder’; 
I’m a ‘gross collector’-type thing, because it’s not rubbish, is it? It’s a clutter of things 
that are reusable.  
Gareth, meanwhile, explicitly rejected the labels of either ‘hoarder’ or ‘collector,’ on the 
grounds that the possessions filling several rooms of the two houses belonging to him and his 
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wife were valuable to him because of ‘the information contained within them,’ rather than 
their ‘physicality.’ 
 
Although the ‘hoarding/collecting’ binary has become commonplace, its boundaries become 
fuzzy when looking at the phenomenon from the viewpoint of the ‘hoarder’ him/herself. It 
rests on the assumption that it is possible to distinguish objectively between items that have 
value – ‘not rubbish,’ as Don puts it – and those that do not, but this rarely remains 
uncontested. Bruce reflected on how his accumulating tendencies had arisen:  
Now how it came to be like that, I think my background – and I’m not blaming my 
background – when I was a little boy, the [Second World] War had just started. 
Everything had a value, every bit of wood, nails from packing cases. We would 
straighten them and collect everything, because everything in my eyes then, and 
indeed now, has potential use. 
The initial disclaimer conveys that he considers his individual choices and agency to have 
had an important role and is not suggesting that the cultural forces of the 1940s fully 
determined his later behaviour,2 yet nonetheless this historical reference drew attention to the 
fluctuations during his lifetime in how ‘waste’ was defined and the value ascribed to it. At 
another moment in the interview, he asserted that,  
My whole psyche – and my father’s – was if it’s useful, save it. There was a slogan 
we had in the war, they put out posters, ‘Make do and mend.’ You did not throw 
clothes away, that is part of my psyche. […] Everyone did it, the whole of British 
society was deeply encouraged by Mr. Churchill to do it. 
Validation by the collective war effort and by the iconic figure of Winston Churchill (both 
highly-regarded in the UK today) offers Bruce a powerful symbolism with which to subvert 
contemporary judgements centring on hoarding.  
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Commentaries such as these indicate how individuals actively strove to contest the identities 
that others ascribed to them because of the extent of their possessions. When they undercut 
the descriptor ‘hoarding’ by claiming that the ‘hoard’ was mostly ‘good stuff’ or endorsed 
alternative labels (‘accumulating’, ‘collecting’), they were employing subtle distinctions not 
easily accommodated within the DSM diagnosis of HD.  
 
Moreover, the centrality of assessments of value and waste to the accounts we gathered 
stands in stark contrast to prevailing perceptions of hoarding. In DSM-5, the diagnostic 
criteria refer to hoarders’ difficulty in parting with items ‘regardless of their actual value’ 
(APA, 2013:247, our emphasis), and hoarders are frequently viewed as undiscriminating 
between worth and worthlessness in objects (Lepselter 2011). Smail writes in relation to 
hoarders ‘how difficult it can be for some people to create and enforce the hierarchy of use 
and uselessness’ (2014:122). However, for our informants items were never entirely 
equivalent in value; they invariably applied hierarchies of what was and was not worth 
keeping, even if those hierarchies are seen by society as deeply idiosyncratic. Equally, 
hoarders are popularly thought to be unwilling to countenance relinquishing any of what they 
have accumulated, but exchange-value in fact featured heavily in the narratives put forward 
in the interviews. For example, Bruce had gathered much of his hoard partly for his hobby of 
carpentry, but he was fully aware that he had far more than he would be able to use himself in 
a lifetime. He was able to give a history of the rise and fall in the price of scrap copper (worth 
£6000 [US$8000-9500] a ton at one point, he claimed, before falling to half that) and said 
that he had been waiting for it to rise again before taking it to the dealer. He used an 
approximate calculation of how much his ‘three truckloads’ of timber would have cost from a 
store to support his argument that what he had accumulated was far from worthless junk. 
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Meanwhile, Don, who like Bruce emphasized the value of much of what he had collected, 
spoke of how he would 
love to have a hoarders’ market where the hoarders get together, get some tables and 
the stuff they’ve got, sell. […] If people think it’s muck but it sells, try and sell it to 
get something back from what you’ve done, your investment in a way.  
Though few had thought through the resale and potential return on their belongings like these 
two, others also raised the possibility of selling on at least some of their things, but claimed 
no suitable opportunities had arisen to date. More exceptionally, one of the social workers 
interviewed described a case characterised by a similar preoccupation with getting value from 
belongings, though manifested very differently. The young man concerned, Douglas, would  
hold onto things like his pizza wrappers and his carrier bags that he’s bought things 
from and I think it’s around him wanting to ... He’s bought those, they're his, “so I’m 
keeping hold of them,” because I don't think he’s really ever had much in his life. 
Rather than resale and potential return, for Douglas what mattered was the extraction of 
maximum value from his purchases while still in ownership of them. That he attributed such 
value not just to the content, but to the wrappings and containers, is at odds with societal 
norms, but cannot be said to be undiscriminating. Douglas perceived value where most others 
would not, but – at least according to his social worker – for him this seems to have been 
closely intertwined with the status or positive affect conferred by ‘owning,’ of having ‘paid 
for,’ the items. Though there was no opportunity to interview Douglas directly, and we 
should therefore be cautious in drawing inferences from this account, this reading of his 
situation strikingly reinforces the contested significance of value in hoarding. 
 
Often it was not the gain resulting from selling that appealed, but the sense that the 
possessions would not be going to waste. Hence Bruce, although he had accepted the 
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necessity for the removal of his hoard, was saddened that the potential value was never 
realized, and emphatically declared that he would have preferred to give it away rather than 
see it wasted. Just as frequently, hoarders suggested that they might donate their possessions 
to charity shops, but also expressed doubts. Angus, for example, seemed initially to be 
showing the classic indecision that has been linked to hoarding, but went on to explain quite 
cogent reasons behind his uncertainty: 
[… I ...] don’t exactly want it but don’t want to throw it away neither. […]I don’t 
know, I’m in two minds as to whether to donate things to charity. A lot of what you 
give to charity ends up in the bin, gets chucked away, I know it does. Even good 
things, brand new things sometimes. I gave my sister a while ago a handbag – Avon 
handbag, still in the packet. Brand spanking new, got it out of a charity shop bin. 
Chucked away. Nothing wrong with it, just nobody had been in to buy it. […]It’s 
mind-boggling, what charities throw away, I tell you. Crazy.  
Angus went on: 
I know what I know, and I know things will end up probably in landfill. Just get 
chucked away and they’re not going to be used for what they ought to be used for. 
They won’t be put to good use, they won’t be, that’s it. Nobody wants them. We live 
in a throwaway society all the time, even animals: pets, dogs, cats. People buy cats 
and dogs for Christmas for people, after a few days or weeks or couple of months, 
“I’m fed up with him now.” Turf him out, he’s on the streets. […]That’s what I mean, 
we live in a throwaway society. It’s a nightmare.  
 The notion of a ‘throwaway society’ came up often for critique. Angus and the others felt 
that they, as owners of things, had a responsibility for them that did not end when they had 
finished getting direct use from them. Even where neither selling nor keeping items was seen 
as desirable, respondents wanted to give them to someone who would value them. In 
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expressing such wishes, our interviewees were envisaging an ‘imagined community’ with 
more effective distribution of objects through society. The excess of ‘waste’ just described 
would be reduced by recovering it into the category of useful material, in such a way as to 
increase societal well-being. Far from the self-absorption that television portrayals often 
suggest is at the heart of the issue (Lepselter 2011), ‘hoarding’ is here constructed by the 
people thus labelled as the by-product of active social concerns.  
 
Connections with Sociality, Relationships and/or Loss 
In keeping with such concerns for wider society, participants also presented concern with 
their own interpersonal relationships and the happiness of those around them as a key reason 
for keeping things. Dominant perceptions of hoarding portray it isolating the hoarder behind 
barricades of material objects, which form both a symbolic and a literal barrier to contact 
with other people (Herring 2014). Interviewees sometimes acknowledged this, to a degree: 
Diana spoke of feeling too ashamed to let people into her house, while both Sarah and Gareth 
referred to the tensions their accumulation caused with their spouses. Bruce, meanwhile, 
seemed to take pride in not being dictated to by social norms, making – in his words – ‘few 
concessions to society’s views’ as ‘I don’t give a toss!’ Yet others saw it differently; in their 
accounts, their possessions acted to reinforce rather than sever social ties. Hence Sophie 
linked her hoarding to a desire for things that had belonged to people, as she felt this would 
create a connection between them. This made her reluctant to throw out things that other 
people had given to her. As she ‘need[ed] to be needed,’ in her words, such connections were 
very important to her and led her to do a lot of voluntary work. One of the reasons for her 
acquisitions was that they meant people would know she might have something they were 
short of. For Sophie, therefore, things not only ‘stood in’ for people, but acted as ‘go-
betweens,’ leading her to accumulate in the hope of anticipating the future needs of others. 
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The reverse process could also occur, as in the case of Janet, who became ‘a bit of a dumping 
ground for other people.’ Knowing that she would be happy to receive things, they were 
reported to have got into the habit of offering old objects to her rather than disposing of them 
in other ways. Like these two, other hoarders we spoke to were active in their local 
communities and by no means ostracised or living as hermits. Though there were exceptions 
– Bruce in particular spoke of his collection as something of a refuge to which he could 
retreat and said that he did not need a lot of people around him – the majority were clear that 
the trajectories of their property, whether coming into, remaining within, or (more seldom) 
leaving their possession, mediated relationships with the goal of increasing not only their own, 
but also others’ happiness. 
 
Not all relationships in life are positive. Don, for example, linked his collecting habit to his 
father’s treatment of him as a child. The story he told was of paternal cruelty: whenever 
relatives or friends would give him toys, his father would destroy them, perhaps out of a 
puritan distaste for play or sheer nastiness. He was once given a set of model planes by his 
aunt: 
My dad was the greenest-eyed demon in the world and I was playing with these 
planes […]My dad came in and he straightaway looked at them and said, “What are 
these?” Mexican hat dance, he stomped on all of them. Destroyed them.    
This had happened so often that Don got into the habit of digging holes in the garden and 
burying his toys in plastic bags, so that he could play with them when his father was not 
around. As he put it, ‘you can understand where the earlier days of what happened to me of 
collecting [came from]’; like Douglas, his approach to his possessions as an adult was shaped 
by early deprivation. It was perhaps in Don’s telling of what collecting now meant to him that 
the value of gifts and friendship came through most strongly; he volunteered detailed 
19 
 
 
accounts of individual gifts he had both given and received, and the reasons why that 
particular item was especially valuable to that particular person. 
 
For some interviewees, experience of loss was linked in with the theme of relationships. In 
these cases, accumulated possessions might index particularly close relationships which had 
been interrupted by death. However, loss need not only be conceptualised in terms of 
relationships with people. Don framed the experiences he recounted of deprivation of his toys 
at the hands of his father as loss of things: 
I think it was just, as I say, because everything was took away from me at an early 
stage. […]I had too much took away from me. 
Now he pointed out that he had given away possessions many times, but indicated how 
unhelpful pressure to declutter might be:  
If I give stuff away it’s my choice – but not to have something taken away from me, 
do you know what I mean? 
 
Physical constraints 
Participants not only engaged with the causes of their accumulation in terms of values, 
relationships, emotion and symbolism, but also in relation to practical difficulties that 
impeded them from keeping greater order in their homes. Health conditions, lack of time, and 
space constraints contributed to the circumstances that led to hoarding. Sophie’s physical 
health impeded her from bending down to pick things up; Sarah lacked energy to clear up. 
Gareth, like others, traced the build-up of things in his home back partly to failures to 
prioritise putting them in order at the time: 
Life was ever full for me, I always had things to do. It just got left. 
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Two people, both living in local authority flats, attributed some blame to lack of space: ‘It’s a 
very confined space’ (Angus); ‘[The flats]’re pigeon-holes, to tell you the truth’ (Don).  
 
Lack of time, energy and space for household possessions is a commonplace modern-day 
experience, hardly restricted to hoarders (Arnold and Lang 2007:47; Löfgren 2016). 
According to our interviewees, these factors exacerbated the states of accumulation in which 
they lived, though none argued that they eclipsed the other considerations described here. 
Practical issues were thus experienced as relevant but not as solely determinant.    
 
Mental health 
Mental health featured in the accounts of many interviewees, though not in uniform ways. 
Martin had taken steps to seek help from the local authority for hoarding only after seeing it 
presented as a mental disorder on television:  
I’d seen on the television about the hoarders, you know. I said to the lady who was 
coming at the time, […] ‘I’ve heard it’s a mental health issue,’ and she said, ‘Well, it 
is, yes.’ 
Conceptualising his situation as mental health-related had provided the impetus to act. Lucy 
recounted how previously she had ‘just kept thinking “oh, it’s me.”’ Learning that hoarding 
could be a mental illness had then felt liberating, explaining ‘why it always seems to keep 
happening, building up again and again.’ Attending a support group had further helped to 
reassure her that she was  
not a complete out-of-space weirdo and that it is a lot more common than people 
realise.  
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In providing a way of making sense of the lack of agency she experienced in the face of the 
‘hoard’, this helped her to accept herself and made available a form of collective identity that 
might otherwise have been inaccessible.  
 
Bruce and Gareth, on the other hand, seemed more ambivalent about the ‘mental health’ label. 
Bruce recounted the relief of encountering a degree of acceptance and normalisation when he 
was found out: 
In some ways I felt relieved that I wasn’t the only - alright - ‘sick’ person, because I 
did feel sick mentally. I thought ‘I’m not the only one.’ I thought I was the only one 
on the planet, I really did. 
He later asked for mental state assessments; when the psychologist had delivered the verdict 
that ‘Bruce is very rational,’ Bruce had responded, ‘Anyone who lives like this must be nuts!’ 
But in Bruce’s account, the final professional verdict was that, 
Apparently I’m hyper-rational, I don’t know whether that’s a good or bad thing – or 
not. 
Gareth too noted that ‘I do pride myself on my rationality.’ In the face of his wife’s regular 
comments that he ‘should go into a mental institution,’ however, he did occasionally question 
his choices:  
There’s a very severe pressure there – you worry about it and you think, ‘Am I being 
rational in what I’m choosing to do?’  
For Bruce, this tension between mental illness and rationality reflects a pervasive oscillation 
within his narrative between – on the one hand – the significant distress that he recognised 
hoarding caused for him and the extent to which it had got out of hand, and – on the other – 
the reasonable explanations he felt he could give for his collecting; Gareth, meanwhile, 
defensively marshalled rationality claims against what he experienced as attacks on his way 
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of living. Both proactively sought to contest imputations of irrationality, implied by HD and 
its popular portrayals, Bruce buttressing this claim by organising his narrative to culminate in 
an ‘expert’ view that to some extent vindicates his justifications. He leaves unanswered 
whether this is ultimately a good or bad thing; not everything that makes sense is necessarily 
helpful, although this seems to be the assumption underlying DSM-5’s invocation of 
rationality in its focus on ‘actual value’.  
 
Martin and Lucy had both previously experienced a period of diagnosed depression, possibly 
making them more comfortable with questions of mental health. For them, mental health 
frameworks pointed to a situation shared with other people who acted in similar ways, 
normalising their behaviour; or, failing that, attenuating the degree to which they could be 
held responsible for it (Littlewood 2002).For Bruce and Gareth, this was contested territory in 
which they resisted the perceived discrediting of their psychologies through claims to 
alternative rationality – a route foregone by Martin and Lucy. Either way, interviewees 
adopted or disputed mental health framings according to the uses they offered. Claims about 
the stigmatising power of HD (Herring 2014) find some resonance, yet also evident is how 
some individuals found that the category mitigated self-stigma by highlighting a common 
experience.  
 
Discussion 
Everyone interviewed had found ways of making sense of hoarding in terms of their life-
stories, social relationships, and personal values. Personal biographies and social contexts 
informed how individuals’ accounts not only dialogued with mental health perspectives, but 
also selectively tapped into the cultural repertoire of established, everyday discourses that 
would resonate with many: getting a fair price for what one sells; rejection of the ‘throwaway 
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society’; green-minded recognition of the importance of recycling; waste not, want not; 
keeping something in memory of a loved one; the difficulty of finding space at home for 
everything. Their narratives challenge the incomprehension, or indifference, with which the 
DSM treats hoarders’ ‘persistent difficulty discarding’ and ‘perceived need to save the items’ 
(APA 2013:247). Some spoke back – at times tentatively or ambivalently, at times with 
conviction – to the professional and societal judgements made about hoarding; Bruce 
highlighted the historical contingency of the value attributed to things, while many suggested 
that the dismissal of their ‘hoard’ stemmed from lack of appreciation or knowledge of its 
worth, whether monetary, use-centred, or affect-laden. Contesting professional judgments in 
this way allowed individual hoarders to position themselves as discerning selves, an 
important counter-narrative that disputes the competency of the comparatively uninformed 
practitioners to evaluate their decisions about keeping and discarding.   
 
Hoarding is commonly linked to mental distress. However, the relative contributions to this 
distress of (a)the phenomenology of the hoarding itself, (b)other experiences of loss or 
trauma and (c)the societal reactions that hoarding provokes, are often unclear. In other words, 
assuming that the hoarding behaviour itself is the key issue to be addressed may over-
simplify, as our interviewees’ accounts illustrated. Yet this is elided by the DSM category of 
HD, in which ‘clinically significant distress’ is equally significant as a diagnostic criterion 
whether caused by hoarding itself or by others’ attempts to prevent it – a catch-22 that makes 
it impossible to take hoarding on the person’s own terms (Eddy 2014) or to see anything 
other than the ‘hoard’ as the problem.  
 
Interviewees’ presentation of identity with regard to thing-relations not only diverged at times 
from this clinical perspective, but is also difficult to reconcile fully with portrayals as 
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“people[…] preternaturally attuned to the call from things” (Bennett 2012:241). Though 
powerful in its revalorisation of an outlook more typically pitied and derided, and doubtless 
insightful in some cases, this common trope potentially further exoticises hoarding. By 
‘othering’ hoarders as the bearers of “special sensory access” to things’ properties (ibid:244), 
it marginalises these participants’ strategic and culturally intelligible use of the repertoire 
available to them in justifying their choices. Most central for them was an acute awareness of 
the networks of people and of exchange in which each item was, and might potentially be, 
embedded. The ‘hoard’ of objects was not generally seen as a barrier to or replacement for 
human relationships (contra Neave 2015), but as a nexus encapsulating forms of worth that 
often had social value at their centre. 
 
It is significant also what the interview data did not say. Remarkably few messages were 
articulated that deal with ridding as simply discarding things, as opposed to disposing of them 
in select, socially lauded ways. Exhortations to recycle or to re-use, or to let charity shops and 
on-line auction sites sell unneeded items, had strong echoes here. Meanwhile, merely 
‘throwing things away’ rarely seemed to be considered as an option. Explicitly, contemporary 
society disapproves of this habitual, still ubiquitous, act. There is a marked contrast with an 
earlier period of modernity, the age of ‘disposability’, characterised by conspicuous pride 
taken in the ability to discard the by-products and obsolescent objects of consumption freely, 
knowing that that they would be efficiently removed from sight and mind (Lucas 2002). Ease 
of disposal has now become ethically more contested, even embarrassing. Yet extensive 
infrastructures continue to be maintained, as dedicated as ever to the convenient removal of 
households’ daily waste from their immediate concerns – the implicit counterpoint to overt 
social condemnation. To the despair of environmental campaigners, much of society prefers 
not to enquire too closely into this contradiction. This, coupled with the remarkable 
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efficiency that accounts for how discarding rubbish has become an automatic, unthinking act 
in daily life, means – as waste researchers have pointed out (Hawkins 2006; Thill 2015:19-21) 
– that disposal has become for the most part a culturally unexamined action. One might 
speculate that the absence of discussion of disposal as something that society defines, in some 
circumstances, as straightforward and acceptable complicates the situation for some of the 
‘hoarders’ who, as the interviews have indicated, often find themselves highly conflicted over, 
and with a pronounced sense of responsibility for, disposal of things they own. Behaviours 
understood as mental disorders, as hoarding has been, commonly index the unresolved 
contradictions of cultural stress-points in this way (Littlewood 2002:17-18). Our informants 
mostly reported that what they found most helpful when they had accepted getting rid of 
some of their possessions were support workers who ‘rolled up their sleeves’ alongside them, 
and provided practical, down-to-earth advice and action on how to sort and discard; perhaps 
they found it a way to avoid over-thinking the question of what were and were not ethical 
forms of disposal.3  
 
In considering the significance of the perspectives expressed in these interviews, due regard 
must be given to other considerations, notably the materiality of hoarding and its 
consequences. To highlight the justifications presented for hoarding is not to ignore the 
material risks it presents: fire hazard, risk of accidents, deterioration of the home, and 
sometimes hygiene concerns. These risks affect others as well as the ‘hoarder’, may therefore 
sometimes justify imposed intervention, and should be acknowledged.  More problematically, 
clinicians may argue that many of the views expressed lack insight and should therefore be 
treated as no more than an epiphenomenon of mental disorder. We concede that qualitative 
interviews of this kind should not unreflexively be accorded privileged truth-status as they 
represent a particular, necessarily partial construction in a specific context (Miczo 2003); 
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anthropology of course favours ethnography because it offers the possibility of observing 
what people do as well as what they say, but it would be extremely challenging to observe the 
slow accumulation of ‘hoards’ of this type. Nevertheless, the data presented here have much 
to say about why these possessions matter to individuals with HD, with important 
implications for practitioners and researchers working with hoarding. ‘Finding the person’ 
(Braye et al. 2014) behind the ‘hoard’ means according due respect to their motivations and 
agency, exploring the ‘meaning of the mess’ (Preston-Shoot and Rockliffe 1984), and 
understanding it within its sociocultural context. In speaking about their reasons for filling 
their homes with things, these individuals alluded to a complex landscape of value, waste, 
social critique, emotion, interpersonal relationships and practical difficulties that can all too 
easily be lost sight of behind ‘HD’ or a focus on psychological deficits. Where this occurs, it 
hinders clear perceptions of the phenomenology of hoarding. 
 
The possibility of diagnosis with HD is far from entirely negative. It opens the possibility of 
therapeutic solutions, where evictions or forced clearances might otherwise be the only 
avenues, and the interviews showed that some people find naming their situation in this way 
reassuring or constructive. Equally, the CBT model has its uses, though its effectiveness is 
frequently limited (Wheaton 2016). The danger is that the availability of the label leads to 
reductionist understandings that submerge the person’s ethical sensibilities or sources of 
comfort beneath a model that conceives hoarding only in terms of deficits. Interventions 
based on such an understanding may be ineffective and obstruct engagement between 
practitioners and service users, whereas more responsive, negotiated approaches often hold 
more promise (Braye et al. 2014). The more meaning-centred focus outlined here therefore 
offers an important corrective. 
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This paper started by discussing how DSM-5 and the application of CBT techniques have 
contributed to shifts in perspective on hoarding. These changes bring hoarding partially out of 
the ambit of housing and environmental health, and under the ‘clinical gaze’ (Foucault 
1963/2003). In this context, as the words of the participants reported here attest, an important 
task for researchers is to ensure that that gaze does not entirely overlook agency, culture and 
meaning when addressing the challenges that hoarding presents.  
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1 For details of the study and more information on the methods followed, see Braye et al. (2014). 
2 In partially disowning the influence of this period, Bruce may also be distancing his self-presentation from 
common British stereotypes of older adults as inveterate hoarders. Janet’s son referenced this:  
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What I did see I put down to being born in 1925 and growing up through the War. It’s a sort of 
stereotypical ‘well, people of that age never threw anything away,’ so you kind of accepted it. 
3 Kilroy-Marac (2016:449-450) describes an interesting variant approach, where Personal Organisers (de-
clutterers) work with the grain of the hoarder’s empathy and ethical responsibility for things by pushing them to 
ask if the thing might be ‘happier’ elsewhere. In the contexts described, this seems an admirable example of 
engaging meaningfully with the person’s lifeworld.  
